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Abstract: In this article I discuss the logic of “complicity” and “dissent” that, under current forms of
ultra-neoliberal capitalism, is no longer (if it has ever been) one of opposition but rather corresponds
to a logic of unrealized potentials, or “as ifs” that “manage” dissent and complicity in conjunction, and
erase the dividing line between them, or their value as separate concepts. I examine the genealogy of
this opposition and its dilution as a symptom of our contemporary political reality. Michel Foucault
presented a paradigmatic view of this genealogy in his analysis of power and the taxonomic separation
of three regimes of power: the sovereign, the disciplinary and the biopolitical. While sovereign power
maintains a “negative” distinction between acts of complicity and of dissent, implemented in the
decision over life and death, both the disciplinary and the biopolitical power adopt a “positive”
paradigm that relates, as I will argue, to figurations of the minor, inferior or infamous. It is precisely
within these figurations that the paradoxical logic of “complicity” and “dissent” becomes more
palpable, inasmuch as they demonstrate that acts of complicity can turn into acts of dissent; and viceversa, that any act of dissent can also function “as if” it was an act of complicity. Thus, there is no
outside of power. Instead every power challenges strategies of counter-power, that at once interrupt
and fuel the existing structures of domination.
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Maria MUHLE
“Il y a de la plèbe”: Figurations of the Minor between Complicity and Dissent
The logics of “complicity” and “dissent” are most commonly understood as two opposed political
strategies aiming at different political goals—such as, to put it bluntly, the conservation of an existing
order through complicity and the reformation or even revolution of this same order through dissent. In
this schematic view, the possibility of choosing one over the other—the possibility of being in dissent
and therefore not complying with any existing order—seems to remain a possible way of action. The
same seems to be true of the “conservative” practice of complicity that needs to exclude any elements
of dissent in order to operate. Obviously such a static and monolithic understanding of politics is today
far from being realistic, and it remains to see if it has ever been realistic. But in the light of
contemporary ultra-neoliberal capitalism, fueled by notions of liberty, freedom and creativity, it seems
all the more evident that a political movement that is aimed at the conservation of a capitalist system
necessarily operates through moments of dissent that tend to be integrated in the ever-growing
capitalist logic. Against this background, that suggests that “complicity” and “dissent” cannot be
thought of as separated logics, it could be interesting to look back at the genealogy of this intertwining
that marks our contemporary political reality. A genealogy that has been presented paradigmatically
by Michel Foucault in his analytics of power and the differentiation between three regimes of power:
the sovereign, the disciplinary and the biopolitical. While sovereign power seems to maintain a clear
distinction between acts of complicity and of dissent implemented by a sovereign power over live and
death, both disciplinary power and biopolitical power shift towards a “positive” paradigm of power
where power relations participate in the logics of complicity as well as those of dissent—even though
in different ways. In what follows, I would like to take a closer look at the specific figurations within
Foucault’s analytics of power, that make this intertwined logics of power explicit. These are, contrary
to the case of sovereign power, not those of the kings, but rather those of the minor, inferior or
infamous subjects of disciplinary and biopolitical power.
Figurations of the “minor” are present in Foucault’s work and thought in several forms: as plebs, as
infamous lives, as dangerous classes, amongst others. They comprise “all those lives destined to pass
beneath any discourse and disappear” (Foucault, “Lives” 161). They stand in a paradoxical relation to
the various shapes of power—sovereignty, disciplines, biopolitical governmentality—a relation that
may be considered mimetic in that it reflects the inner circuits of the formations of power and
figurations of the political in Foucault. Thus, one could say, this mimetic relation of the
characterizations of the minor and their corresponding power regimes places before us the flipside of
Foucault’s central thesis in Discipline and Punish, that “[t]he man described for us, whom we are
invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself” (30).
For, the remarkable positivity and productivity of power, specified as its basic distinguishing mark and
elaborated as such from Discipline and Punish onwards, unfolds against the background of the
paradoxical dynamic of power and counterpower, which Foucault brings into view by considering
figurations of the minor.
1.
As is well known, Foucault’s investigations after the publication of Discipline and Punish in 1975 aim to
depict an analytic of power, to elaborate an analytical view of power that lets us see its internal
displacements and understand in particular the productivity of its post-sovereign forms. In Discipline
and Punish and other major works, Foucault does not provide a model of politics that would be
opposed to this kind of power. Foucault’s claim about the omnipresence and insuperability of power
relations and the apparent neglect of politics in his thought is often construed as posing a dilemma for
a Foucauldian analysis of power, which would necessitate a revision of his analytic of power through
the third “theoretical shift” noted in the introduction to the Use of Pleasure (6).
In his book on Foucault, Gilles Deleuze discusses this admission of a supposed impasse in
Foucault’s conception of power. For Deleuze, this does not point to a shortcoming in the conception.
Rather, according to Deleuze, Foucault “found the impasse to be where power itself places us, in both
our lives and our thoughts, as we run up against it in our smallest truths” (96). Deleuze spots an exit
from this impasse in a “new” axis, a subject-axis, which is distinguished from power- and knowledgeaxes, but neither just revises nor denies them. For the so-called “three axes”—knowledge, power, and
subject—are present in Foucault’s thought from the beginning and do not give way to each other
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(power retreating upon the entry of the subject, for example). This becomes especially clear in rereading Discipline and Punish and Foucault’s talk of the instruments of subjectivation, that is, the
technologies of subjectifying and subjection, the apparatus [dispositifs] producing subjection qua
subjectification.
In this sense the appearance of the subjectivating complex intensifies the inner tangle of the three
“axes.” For, neither the talk of subjectification nor that of counter-discourses has any place outside
power; they always only exist intertwined with it internally and come about through it. Accordingly,
there cannot be for Foucault any place for politics beyond power. Rather, there exist “counterdiscourses,” “counter-power” or “counteractions” [contre-conduites], whose possibility Foucault
articulates among other places in his work with the Group for Information on Prisons as well as in his
research on the plebs, the infamous, and the lettres de cachet. The locus of such a “politics” of contreconduite is those of the so-called “minor works,” which, again, Deleuze had described as the other half
of Foucault’s thought. These draw out those “lines of actualization,” which Foucault had not formulated
in his main works “out of concern for rigor, from the resolve not to confound everything, from a
confidence in the reader” (Deleuze 96).
In one of these “minor works,” the well-known interview “Powers and Strategies” conducted by
Jacques Rancière in 1977—two years after the publication of Discipline and Punish—for the recently
founded journal Révoltes Logiques, Foucault puts his finger on the specific interconnection of power
and politics when he writes that “resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be
real, nor is it inexorably frustrated through being the compatriot of power” ( “Powers and Strategies”
142). That there is no “outside to power” does not per se neutralize resistance to power. This claim,
which means that power and counter-power are to be thought as intrinsically interlaced, was preceded
by an earlier tentative determination of one of those figures that harbor such a potential for resistance
in the sense of counter-power, the figure of the plebs. Foucault writes:
There is certainly no such thing as “the plebs’; rather there is, as it were, a certain plebeian quality or
aspect [il y a de la plèbe]. There is plebs in bodies, in souls, in individuals, in the proletariat, in the
bourgeoisie, but everywhere in a diversity of forms and extensions, of energies and irreducibilities. This
measure of plebs is not so much what stands outside relations of power as their limit, their underside, their
counter-stroke, that which responds to every advance of power by a movement of disengagement. Hence it
forms the motivation for every new development of networks of power. (“Powers” 138)

Thus, the plebeian is not a sociological entity, but, rather, a quantity or a proportion, which escapes
the power relations in the disciplined, regulated individuals, groups, or classes completely subjugated
by power relations: “something which is by no means a more or less docile or reactive primal matter,
but rather a centrifugal movement, an inverse energy, a discharge” (138). There can be no genuine
place for or bearer of this inverse energy, and, rather, it appears in the most differentiated registers:
as just a part of the population, or social groups, or in the single individual—and indeed in every case
as an excessive moment, which remains neither on an individual level nor within a determinate social
group, but, rather, essentially concerns the totality of the political order. The plebs, as Alain Brossat
writes,
arise in irregular and changing flows and independent of external conditions produce varying effects of
interruption, displacement, and insecurity. And although the faces and appearances of the plebs are
infinitely variable, they are identified with remarkable consistency as the dregs, the unclassifiable, the
undocumented or the infamous—depending on the relevant rationale employed by the reigning order. (213)

Contrary to the traditional categories of the people, the masses, the proletarians as documented,
visible, and sayable historical collectivities the plebs have “no substance” and consequently it is
impossible to ascribe their roll to a historical subject.
The plebs share this unclear constitution with another figuration of minority, which Foucault treats
under the heading of the infamous, whose “voices” are bound in the silence of private, extra-political
and extra-judicial space and which are neither visible nor sayable for the so constituted politics. Even
they produce a kind of “counter-discourse,” which can occur exclusively outside of power, as Foucault
showed in his paradigmatic text “Infamous Lives” also published in 1977. For here again it is power
itself which makes the infamous into the paradoxical place of a kind and type of resistance tied to
discourse. And it does this as it were unwittingly insofar as it places in its very hand the instrument of
power in the form of lettres de cachet.
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2.
In the lectures “Truth and Juridical Forms,” which were presented in Rio de Janeiro in 1973 and which
can be read as preparatory studies for Discipline and Punish and already contain key passages
concerning panoptical mechanisms, Foucault takes the practice of lettres de cachet as a horizon for
the genealogy of the prison. In the fourth lecture, which explicitly considers the disciplinary practice of
“examination,” Foucault investigates the correlative type of power as a form of normalizing power
avant la letter. The disciplinary society replaces the penal reform movements of the 18 th century
through the actual expansion of a paradoxical form of punishment, which looks ahead to the juridical
form of examination. The prison aims not at the reproduction of law but functions as the site of
preemption, that is aimed at the regulation and normalization of individual modes of behavior: “In the
nineteenth century, penal justice aimed, in an increasingly insistent way, not so much at the general
defense of society as the control and psychological and moral reform of the attitudes and behavior of
individuals” (“Truth” 56).
The penal system was no longer oriented towards the judgment or legal ruling over past crimes
and so needed no knowledge of what actually transpired. Rather, it looked to control possible actions
of individuals, which were presumed to be discovered by means of examining and inspecting them:
the central concept of the penal system is hence the dangerousness of individuals, who must be
examined at the level of their potential behavior in order to detect anomalies in advance, to neutralize
dangerous dispositions, to prevent violations of the law before they could occur. To enable such
control over humans in their potentiality, or as Foucault says, “a control of their future behavior while
this was still taking form,” (“Truth” 57) penal institutions had to extend over all realms of social life.
The control of potential behavior cannot only be a matter for the judiciary, but, rather, required a
whole network of disciplinary and thus extra-judicial institutions, the police, but also psychological,
psychiatric, pedagogical, criminological, and medical institutions. The life of individuals in its entirety is
now surveilled, controlled, cultivated, and investigated in its entire extent—we enter the age of
“generalized orthopedics” (58).
Foucault had here already designated this model of controlling power “panopticism” and
genealogically traced it to various historical processes such as the proliferation of private societies for
the defense of morality in England and the introduction of lettres de cachet in France. These “letters of
the sign/signet” were letters signed by the king of France, countersigned by one of his ministers, and
closed with the royal seal, or cachet. They contained orders directly from the king, often to enforce
arbitrary actions and judgments that could not be appealed. They emerged during the 13 th century
and were abolished by the French revolution though briefly reinstated by Napoleon. The best-known
lettres de cachet, and the ones that were of the most interest to Foucault, were the penal ones by
which a subject was imprisoned without trial and without an opportunity of defense. Imprisonment
could be in a state prison or an ordinary jail, or mean confinement in a convent or the General
Hospital of Paris, or even entail transportation to the colonies, or expulsion to another part of the
realm, or from the realm altogether. The lettres were mainly used against drunkards, troublemakers,
prostitutes, squanderers of family fortune, or insane persons.
Consequently, Foucault explains how these “curious” lettres de cachet belonged essentially to
precisely that parajudicial practice, which, in France, received the form of the police, with its own
officials, its own architecture—the Bastille or the Bicêtre—and even its own “institutional aspect” with
the lettres de cachet. These constituted “one of the major instruments of power of the absolute
monarchy” insofar as they, qua royal commands and not just laws or edicts, exercised a force over
any individual, who could be imprisoned at the discretion of the king. They were tantamount to “an
instrument of royal despotism crashing down on someone like a lightning bolt, able to imprison him
for the rest of his days” ( “Truth” 65). At the same time, Foucault reminds us that these letters were
also “a way of escaping the law,” (65) insofar as they functioned as petitions by deceived husbands,
dissatisfied fathers, quarreling families, and cloven communities, beseeching royal authority to enforce
what was at bottom their own private will. The lettres de cachet were in this way “a kind of
counterpower, a power that came from below, enabling groups, communities, families, or individuals
to exercise power over someone. They were instruments of a control that was voluntary in a sense, a
control from below… a way of regulating the everyday morality of social life… to provide for their own
police control and ensure their own order” (65-66). And so Foucault concludes that this “parajudicial
practice of lettres de cachet” reveals the “origin” of the prison insofar as it could inflict parajudicial
punishment in virtue of being a parajudicial practice, as was the case with imprisonment, which was
not a legal punishment for the penal system of the 17th and 18th centuries.
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Thus, Foucault, on the one hand, characterizes the infamous and the extra-judicial practice of
lettres de cachet as a counterpower. Yet, on the other hand, he notes that they did not at all lead to a
generalizable resistance against power. For, the counterpower mediated through the lettres de cachet
is yet again a regulating and controlling power, which, it is granted, effectively permeates the
sovereign monopoly of power, but does not thereby cause any “political” effects in the emphatic
sense. Foucault’s talk of the counteractions and counterpowers must be understood in precisely this
sense, as strategies, therefore, which did not simply break free from power, but, rather, whose
resistive capacity was always already ensnarled in their inner contradictions.
3.
In talking of “flash existences” in the aforementioned text “Lives of Infamous Men,” which too focuses
on this paradoxical practice of power, Foucault more or less directly builds on the comments made in
the lecture discussed above, while describing these existences more dramatically as “poem-lives.”
(“Lives” 159) Here, Foucault’s train of thought takes another turn, when he underlines the archival
function of power that recorded the words “to recall their fleeting trajectory” (161).
The concrete manner in which this collision with power occurs appears all the more interesting,
because, for Foucault, power itself lends the model, which the speaker or writer of insignificant infamy
must emulate in order to compel the attention of that power. In their archived pleas the infamous
reach for the written word, which was not capable of being written in any obvious sense, since neither
was the banality of their life “worth” describing, nor was writing itself accessible. They are
paradigmatic figures of a minority, who do not enter the annals of history either in descriptions by
others or in their own self-description, save for that accidental encounter with power. Only thanks to
this encounter do they write, or become written about, and comport themselves to the scribal
apparatus, where they emerge in excessive forms as they seek to slip in through imitation or
emulation, leading to quirky and paradoxical rhetorical effects. For the texts of infamy adorn
themselves with a rhetoric one cannot dispense with if one wants to catch the eye of the sovereign,
texts that strive to mimic the ceremonious splendor of sovereign power. The petitions, evaluations,
denunciations proceed in this way through an as-if logic: banal family histories are recited as if they
were great crimes, to give birth to an “emphatic theater of the everyday,” a grandeur and the
disparity of an insignificant writing. By the imitation and emulation of “grand rhetoric” and the
theatricalized, baroque style, the ignoble—minor—lives sought to draw the monarch’s notice: “The
political discourse of banality could not be anything but solemn” (“Lives” 170).
This imitation was necessarily accompanied by an “effect of incongruity,” which gave the texts their
specific stamp: when the infamous persons or the semi-literate writers representing them addressed
the monarch, they mixed formulaic politesse with “words that were awkward and violent, loutish
expressions by which they hoped no doubt to give their expressions more force and truthfulness”
(Foucault, “Lives” 170).
According to Foucault, this incongruous rhetoric is normalized under post-sovereign, disciplinary
relations of power, when disciplinary mechanisms of control place the “colorless categories of
administration, journalism, and science” (“Lives” 172) upon the peculiar disparity of these lifehistories, relegating, in turn, their modulations to literature. If the “politics” of these writing-scenes of
infamy thus depends on the dissonance and the disparate rhetoric of solemnity inspired by sovereign
power, post-sovereign disciplinary power is enacted precisely at this juncture by inscribing these
incongruous practices of the infamous into coercive systems of disciplinary power, taking them as
normalizing-disciplinary points of entry. It is therefore just this precarious relation between the figures
of minority and language through which language becomes ambivalent and uncertain, or excessive, a
relation upon which the power of writing through disciplines operate, to divert it and invert it, that is
to say, too normalize it. Consequently, not only can we portray the dynamic of power and
counterpower—or of complicity and dissent—at play here, but, at the same time, we can also specify
more clearly one of the displacements of power, which came up in Foucault’s analytic of power.
4.
As Foucault explains in Discipline and Punish, this displacement accompanies the emergence of
individualization as one of the fundamental mechanisms of disciplinary power, whereby it is essentially
distinguished from the techniques of sovereign power as well as from power’s biopolitical and
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governmental strategies in a still more decisive sense. While the target of sovereign power is the
juridical subject, and biopolitical governmentality mainly aims to produce a whole in the form of a
population to be penetrated and ruled in its globality, the disciplines direct their techniques of power
to fitting out and training individuals. In this vein, the mechanism of individualization aims at bottom
to survey variations between individuals in order to plot these upon a given plane, to particularize
their distinct qualities and to harmonize the differences between them, thus making them productive.
For Foucault, this process depends on a key technique, which operates in a controlling as well as
normalizing way, namely, the examination, which is at once an apparatus of knowledge and of power.
The object of the techniques of examination and their documentary reformulation, according to
Foucault, is to produce “cases,” which are resultantly the selfsame object of knowledge and power.
Here, the individual appears in its genuinely disciplinary character: that individual, which one
describes, surveys, and compares with others on the basis of their own individuality, and that very
individual, who must be trained, classified, normalized, or excluded. The individual, who up till now
had been deemed unworthy of description or attention, acquires a privileged standpoint through
disciplinary techniques in being investigated, described, and recounted to the last detail. If earlier only
the lives of kings, noblemen, and saints were depicted, the disciplines now speak of everyone and at
the same time make everyone susceptible to disciplinary control: “This turning of real lives into writing
[mise en écriture] is no longer a procedure of heroization; it functions as a procedure of objectification
[objectivation] and subjection [assujettissement]” (Foucault, Discipline 192).
Thus, the individual as case just means the describable, measurable, and comparable individual to
be normalized, classified, and trained. This individuality, however, first enters power’s field of vision
when the “seuil de description,” the threshold of what can be described, and thus even perceived, is
lowered. If, to be looked at, “observed, described in detail, followed from day to day by an
uninterrupted writing was a privilege” in the premodern era, then this representational hierarchy of
writing and describing is upset by the disciplinary technique of examination and paradoxically
transformed into a method of control. On the one hand, the disciplinary methods “lowered the
threshold of describable individuality,” that is, they broke down the hierarchy of those dignified in
written works, but, on the other hand, they “made of this description a means of control and a method
of domination” (Foucault, Discipline 191). In this way the power of writing fashioned material
dispositions in the form of documentation. Lowering the threshold of what can be described had
disciplining, codifying effects. Disciplinary power produced its object in describing it and thus created
its own reality.
Consequently, “examination” as a crucial technology of the disciplinary apparatus throws a
“network of writing [réseau d’écriture]” over individuals and encompasses them “in a whole mass of
documents that capture and fix them” (Foucault, Discipline 189), in order to exercise complete
supervision and control over each and every individual. The “power of writing” so constituted is
tasked with documenting individuals, describing and inscribing them ever further into systems of
control and surveillance. Individuality, as the result of disciplinary examination, can then be
“transcribed” in lists and forms, i.e., copied out and written off at the most base-level writing acts
thereby formalized and normalized.
A further innovation of “disciplinary writing,” Foucault tells us, supplements the translative tasks of
transcription, one that consists in the comparison, compilation, and grouping of individual traits, a
synthesizing function of ordering and classifying, finding averages and fixing norms. Through such a
writing apparatus a smooth transition from the general register to individual (clinical) case-histories
and vice-versa becomes possible. The singular trait or exception is part of a great system of records,
within which every individual variation has repercussions for the general curve of normality in an
entirely statistical sense. Thanks to such a writing apparatus (appareil d’écriture) examination
introduces two correlative possibilities: first, the individual, along with his capacities and skills
becomes a completely describable particular object, and, second, the individual becomes a part of a
global comparative scheme, or to use the catchphrase of biopolitics, becomes regulated as a part of
the population.
In this sense disciplinary power responds to those strategies of “minor” mimesis, which oppose a
“power from below” to exemplary power, i.e. subvert a specific hierarchy of speech and visibility with
the generalized inscription and description of the minor, infamous, or plebeian lives, which raises them
into the realm of the sayable and the visible, but, at the same time carries out a process of
neutralization and codification.
It is just this equivocal relation of the infamous or the minor to language, especially to writing, to
which disciplinary power responds with the formulation of the “power of writing,” whose job is to
restrict the ambivalence of this writing and to understand it as a series of signs to which the
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disciplined body can react in a strictly unique way. Disciplinary language is understood as code, as a
machinery for producing unequivocality, which yields the disciplined individual qua description or by
insertion into the domain of fit-for-writing. Moreover, this double function of writing, which at once
raises and subordinates, which, while simultaneously imprinting into a determinate place and time,
makes the individual visible, is symptomatic of the paradoxical make-up of disciplinary power, as
much positive as negative, which opens onto the strategies of biopolitical governmentality.
5.
Thus, the structure of disciplinary power is double: at once repressive (compliant) and productive
(dissentive), and thus only repressive qua productivity. It is a trait it shares with the structure of
biopolitical governmentality and which was the key result shown by Foucault’s analytic of power. It
can be understood, according to this thesis, only against a contrast which acquired prominence in the
1973 lectures referring to the lettres de cachet: Namely, the contrast between the penal system and
the extra-judicial status of the lettres de cachet—or between “pénalité judiciaire” (judiciary penalty)
and a “pouvoir de la norme” (power of the norm) as Foucault reformulates it in Discipline and Punish.
And this was in fact grounded not so much in the concrete phenomena of lettres de cachet in 17th and
18th century France but, rather, in the conflict of constitutional law and extra-judicial practices, which
is how things were with the lettres de cachet. Ignoring how this opposition accounts for the surprising
fact of the birth of the prison, which was still not provided for as a form of punishment by
constitutional law—the prison as an initially extra-judicial phenomenon takes root in an ensuing
departure from extra-judicial practices. This opposition is crucial with regard to the amalgam of power
and resistance in Foucault’s thought, as this was mentioned at the outset, which is especially seen
with the help of figurations of the infamous or the plebeian. And it clarifies the link between disciplines
and governmental biopolitics, thus between those forms of power in which the exercise of power is
realized as the positive practice of individuals and the population.
Insofar as the minor, the plebeian, the infamous is not a constituted people in any measure, it is
also not politicized through consensual, juridical means of coming to be in a free space of society and
hence does not supply a juridically verifiable response to power. Its politicization cannot operate
through a simple complicity with an existing political (or juridical) order, but has to pass though
practices of dissent with the established (dominating) order to articulate a political presence. It does
not aim at representation, or even presentation, of the “minor,” but, rather, articulates the latter
quasi-mimetically around moments of disruption. This elude complete disciplinary describability by
producing effects of dissonance or of dissent, thus bringing their emulation of the regnant exemplary
power again to the forefront, for example, by accumulating or appropriating the individualizing forms
of description. Phillipe Artières had read this mimetic dynamic in view of the “bad literature”
(mauvaise littérature) of psychiatric reports, based on which Foucault had investigated the rise of
modern psychiatry in his lectures on the Abnormal. It was in this way that scraps of conversation,
which were hitherto imperceptible, became legible through the documented self-descriptions and
descriptions of abnormal individuals, and protests and demands, which were not supposed to have any
place here, came to be seen. These minimal texts come to communicate an insight, which structurally
builds on the one discerned in the lettres de cache. For the abnormal, pathological voices respond to
their judges and doctors, insofar as they use expression, which was conceded to them for therapeutic
ends, at once in the sense it has in the therapeutic model as well as to register protest against it:
“Insofar as they play with the rules and dictates that dominate their writing, the writers express a
number of protests and demands” (Artières, “Michel” 80). In this way there also occurs an excess of
language at this point and indeed again in the emulation of the official or institutional speech, which is
by now the scientific discourse of psychiatry.
One can therefore conclude that the “mediums” of the plebs or the infamous comprises all these
“minimal,” the inferior, minor or the “bad” literature of the “lettres de cachet,” petitions and
psychiatric evaluations, inasmuch as they enable interruptions and diversions of power structures
through quasi-mimetic appropriation. As “counterpower from below,” as a specific power of dissent,
they instance new structures of power, which can give rise to political effects in turn, without having
to, and which need not be conceived as universal political emancipation in any case, which would have
located them beyond power and complicity. Rather, it is a matter of singular breaks and
displacements, which sustain the very interplay of power and counterpower: A power of dissent that is
not thinkable beyond complicity; but also a complicity that is always punctuated by practices of
dissent.
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The central idea is therefore that the mimetic character of these minor texts does not aim at
presenting infamous lives, and one does not have to do with a simple presentation of those unfit for
presentation or with a mimesis of the minor which would project the non-presentable into
presentability. Thus, Foucault writes: “Real lives were ‘enacted’ in these few sentences: by this I don’t
mean that they were represented but that their liberty their misfortune, often their death, in any case
their fate were actually decided therein, at least in part” (“Lives” 160). Rather, in such enactment, the
question concerns the form of minor mimesis precisely because it does not go into presentation,
producing bizarre effects, and thus in every instance a surplus. Such a minor mimesis lays language
bare in its excessiveness, its “literarity” or “homonymy,” to use Rancière’s terms (Distribution 39-40;
The Names 24 ff.). In his “Lives of Infamous Men” Foucault shows how this excessiveness works in
the speech of the infamous, although this is not and does not have to be a purely verbal affair, as
Foucault shows in the case of Pierre Rivière’s violent acts or with reference to plebeian uprisings and
agitations. Exactly here, one may say in conclusion, lies the radical element of Foucault’s thought,
which simply cannot be integrated into a consensual (or complicit) model of politics. This becomes
especially evident in the description in Discipline and Punish of the doubled constitution of power, at
once subordinating and productive, compliant and dissenting, and so in the fact that the most
enlightened (dissenting) subject is always already the result of techniques of power of complicity that
in turn can never completely neutralize the practices and strategies of dissenting counterpower either.
This lead, this trace, can and must be thought further through Foucault’s later work, through the
purported “turn” to the subject, in the technologies of the self.
Translation from German: Meghant Sudan
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